The Passenger Vessel Services Act (PVSA), a 123-year old cabotage law, attempts to shield U.S. maritime shipping from foreign competition. It also applies to the U.S. cruise ship industry. The PVSA requires foreign cruise ships that carry passengers between U.S. ports to also stop at foreign ports. Norwegian Cruise Line America (NCLA), which operates one U.S. flagged cruise ship in Hawaii, wants the U.S. Customs and Border Protection to require foreign cruise ships offering Hawaii itineraries from the U.S. west coast to spend more time in foreign ports. We analyze the merits of NCLA's proposal. We argue that rather than making the PVSA even more protectionist, the law should be repealed.
laws "are to assure reliable domestic shipping service and the existence of a maritime capability that is completely subject to national control in times of war or national emergency." 5 Current federal regulation allows foreign cruise ships to make round trips between U.S. ports and stop along the way at intermediate U.S. ports so long as the ships make a stop at a foreign port and passengers do not leave the trip at one of the intermediate ports (GAO, 2004, p. 5) . For example, the popular 7-day round-trip Alaska Inside Passage cruise which stops at several Alaska ports is served only by foreign cruise ships; voyages departing from Seattle, Washington make a brief stop in a Canadian port such as Vancouver or Victoria, British Columbia. Violators are currently subject to a fine of $300 for each passenger illegally transported. The foreign port stoppage requirement increases cost to both cruise lines and their passengers. It alters and reduces the cruise options available to consumers. It confers economic rent to U.S. ports that service these cruise ships by virtue of their proximity to foreign ports. For example, many foreignflagged cruise ships sail from San Diego or Los Angeles to Hawaii and return with a stop in nearby Ensenada, Mexico to comply with the PVSA, but rarely do cruise ships sail from San Francisco to Hawaii. 6 The PVSA also confers rents to foreign ports at the expense of U.S. ports.
A heated controversy is currently brewing over whether the U.S. Bureau of America's (NCLA) Pride of America, which offers 7-day weekly cruises among the Hawaiian islands.
In this paper we ascertain the merits of this proposed rule change. The paper also advances our knowledge of the impact of the Passenger Vessel Services Act on the North American cruise industry. While there exists a substantial body of research on the economic effects of the Jones Act, we are unaware of significant studies on the PVSA. 7 We show that a reinterpretation of the PVSA would not be in the nation's best interest as it would harm consumers, the cruise industry, and U.S. port economies. We argue that rather than make the PVSA more protectionist, the law should be repealed.
II. Norwegian Cruise Line's Business in Hawaii
The cruise industry was a latecomer to Hawaii (State of Hawaii, Department of Business, Economic Development and Tourism, circa 2004; Blair and Mak, 2008) . In the 1980s, American Hawaii Cruises, a subsidiary of American Classic Voyages (ACV), began offering interisland cruise itineraries using two 30-year old, small U.S.-built ocean-7 But see GAO, 2004 which examines the potential (rather than the ex post) impacts of granting NCLA a monopoly in the Hawaii interisland cruise market. The GAO focuses extensively on the history of the PVSA and other legal issues, particularly how the exemption from the foreign built requirement might affect the implementation of the PVSA, U.S. vessel documentation laws, or the Jones Act. It is noteworthy that while the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) periodically measures the welfare losses attributable to the Jones Act, it has yet to perform similar analysis on the Passenger Vessel Services Act because "the domestic cruise industry is too small to have measurable effects using the current [CGE] model." (USITC, 1999, pg. 86 citing a sharp decline in business after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. At that point, one ship was partially complete and parts for the second ship had been ordered. The suspension of construction on the two ships cost the U.S. taxpayers $185 million in loan guarantees.
Norwegian Cruise Line (NCL) capitalized on ACV's demise in 2001 by starting its own Hawaii-based cruise tourism business. In December 2001, NCL began offering 7-day interisland cruises on its foreign-built and foreign-flagged ship, the Norwegian Star. To comply with the provisions of the PVSA, the Norwegian Star had to make a stop at a foreign port during its 7-day interisland cruise. NCL elected to make a lengthy roundtrip voyage to Fanning Island, an atoll of 13 square miles with a population of 1,600 in the Republic of Kiribati (Leidemann, 2002) . This detour took more than 3 days of the 7-day Hawaiian islands cruise including a six hour layover at Fanning Island. NCL signed an agreement with the Kiribati government that granted the company exclusive visitation rights thus preempting possible encroachment by other cruise lines into its Hawaii business (Lo, 2004 Early financial returns from NCL's Hawaii-Fanning Island operations were encouraging.
Ship yields were higher than in other, fiercely competitive markets such as the Caribbean (Duchemin, 2002) .
Buoyed by its early success in Hawaii, NCL wanted to expand its offerings to include cruise itineraries that did not include side trip to Fanning Island. NCL purchased the partially completed Project America vessel and the parts for the second vessel in late 2002 and transported them to a shipyard in Germany to have the ships completed there (GAO, 2004, p. 9) . To employ the two foreign-built vessels in strictly domestic service in Hawaii, NCL needed to obtain a waiver from the PVSA. Senator Inouye, who saw an opportunity to resurrect the Project America ships and the creation of 10,000 jobs in Hawaii, offered to help (Inouye, 2003; Wayne, December 14, 2003 Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, or in Alaska. For an account of the politics behind this effort, see Wayne, December 14, 2003. 10 Even though NCLA was required to operate the three Pride ships in "regular service"-defined as "primary service in which the ship is engaged on an annual basis"--in Hawaii, GAO opines that NCLA might be able to offer some service to the East and West coasts. The lawyers it consulted suggested that the ships must spend at least 51 percent of their time in Hawaii in order to comply with the exemption (GAO, 2004, pp. 13-14) . NCLA never used its Pride ships in regular service between U.S. west coast ports and Hawaii. 11 But FTC (2002) actually stated the following: "Nevertheless, cruising is differentiated from other forms of vacations. Despite some evidence that the cruise lines consider landbased vacations serious competitive threats (and vice-versa) , the cruise lines' primary competitive focus is on each other. The evidence also shows that the cruise lines expend significant effort to monitor (to the best of their ability) each other's prices, deployments, and other behavior, and that only occasionally do they closely monitor the price or capacity of non-cruise vacation options." 12 NCLA opined that labor costs for its U.S. flag operations would likely be 100 to 150 percent higher than labor costs for its foreign flag operations (GAO, 2004, p. 23 ). GAO's own investigation indicated that labor costs were about 70 percent higher on U.S. flagged vessels (GAO, 2004, p. 23, footnote #38) .
cruises (See Figure 1 for If we focus only on operating income (loss), the company reported positive operating income for all four years. The largest non-operating expense item was interest. 15 NCLA was also plagued by serious service problems (Toth, 2004; Arakawa, June 6, 2005) . Poor service was not unrelated to NCL's staffing problems. From the very beginning, NCL had trouble recruiting, training, and retaining its all-U.S. citizen staff (Yamanouchi, 2004; Arakawa, 2005 and expected NCLA to be profitable "with a one-vessel scenario." (Dingeman, May 1, 2008) .
NCL placed the blame for its earlier financial problems on depressed cruise prices in part on its own decision to expand capacity too rapidly 16 but in its application for federal government help assigned most of the blame on the "unprecedented" increase in competition from foreign cruise ships particularly those offering 15-day round-trip cruises from the U.S. west coast that were making token stops in Ensenada, Mexico to comply with the PVSA (Homeland Security, 2007, pp. 65488-65489; Camire, February 11, 2008; Dingeman, February 27, 2007) 17 . The near-term prospects for the company did 
III. Lobbying to Make the PVSA More Protectionist
NCLA lobbied the U.S. Maritime Administration and CBP to reinterpret the 18 The company said that moving the Pride of Hawaii to Europe was a "temporary withdrawal." (Dingeman, April 11, 2007, p. A2 .) The enabling legislation is silent on whether or not the ship could be brought back to Hawaii under U.S. registry once it was deflagged. 19 Apollo Management received 50 percent ownership interest in NCL.
PVSA to make it more difficult for foreign cruise ships to carry passengers from U.S.
west coast ports to Hawaii by requiring them to spend more time in foreign ports. In 1.) to stop at a foreign port for at least 48 hours;
2.) port time in foreign ports must be more than 50 percent of the time at U.S.
ports of call; and 3.) passengers must be permitted to go ashore temporarily at the foreign ports
More than 90 percent of the 358 comments received by CBP opposed the proposed rule change.
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To placate opponents, NCLA agreed that the proposed rule change should only apply to round trip voyages from U.S. ports to Hawaii. In a letter to the CBP dated December 21, 2007 (Yamamoto, 2007) NCLA wrote "…the proposed interpretation should be clarified so that its scope is limited to vessels operating roundtrip voyages from U.S. ports that include Hawaii port calls…Such a limitation protects U.S. flag passenger vessel interests without prejudicing U.S. port interests. In contrast, an application of the proposed interpretation to 'any itinerary' would needlessly harm U.S. port interests unrelated to Hawaii without any countervailing benefit to U.S.-flag passenger vessel interests." Strikingly, NCLA failed to mention the potential effect of the proposed rule change on consumer welfare.
In July, 2008, Homeland Security submitted to the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on behalf of CBP its revised proposal which states that foreign-flagged vessels engaged in regular service to Hawaii would be in violation of the PVSA unless: 1) the cumulative length of stay at foreign port(s) is more than 50 percent of the total amount of time spent at the intervening U.S. ports, and 2.) passengers are permitted to go ashore at the foreign port(s). (Dudley, 2008) . The Chief of Homeland Security's regulatory branch opined that an economic analysis of the proposed rule change was unnecessary (Sutton, 2008) . OMB disagreed.
OMB's decision was greeted with relief by the American Association of Port Authorities and Cruise Lines International Association. However, the issue is not dead. NCLA 23 At http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf 24 The "need" for federal intervention may arise from "a statutory or judicial directive." (A-4, p.
3) It can also arise (A-4, p. 4) because of "a significant market failure or to meet some other compelling public needs such as improving governmental processes or promoting intangible values such as distributional fairness or privacy." The primary emphasis is on enhancing economic efficiency.
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announced that it would try again to get the rule changed after CBP complies with OMB's regulatory requirements (Sharp, August 16, 2008; Blair, August 29, 2008) .
V. The Merits of NCLA's Claims
NCLA blamed its financial difficulties on depressed cruise ticket prices due to normal passenger capacity, (9) the vessel's maximum passenger capacity, (9) total passenger nights = (6) x (7), and (10) However, the data set does not contain any financial information such as cruise prices, operating revenues and expenses, and so on. Indeed, as Table 2 shows, few people take lengthy cruises. would be worse off because they have to incur higher cost of getting to and from the ship's homeport; that means there will be fewer passengers taking cruises to Hawaii.
Moreover, the economic rents that were formerly reaped by the U.S. west coast port cities from home-porting these ships will now be transferred to port economies in Mexico and Figure 3 also provides strong evidence that NCLA's short-term financial difficulties can be attributed to its own decision to deploy too much capacity too quickly. Table 3 shows that in 2009 NCLA is a "premium priced" cruise ship company. Table 3 was constructed by compiling interisland cruise prices in Hawaii vis-à-vis cruise prices in other markets by carefully searching cruise line websites during the month of October, 2008 for future cruises. We confined our price searches to posted prices for the 7-day Table 3 we provide only the mean price (unweighted) per day for each market for 2009. (Jainchill, December 9, 2008; also Honolulu Advertiser, December 12, 2008) . It would hardly seem necessary to make the PVSA even more protectionist when the company has finally figured out how to run a profitable domestic cruise ship company after a difficult beginning.
Reinterpreting the PVSA Only to Apply to the Hawaii Trade NCLA had hoped that supporting a rule change that applies only to foreign cruise ships sailing to Hawaii would soften objections from mainland port cities that were not involved in the Hawaii cruise trade. Again, NCLA was wrong in its analysis.
Cruise tourism is the quintessential "footloose" industry. Cruise ships are constantly being moved between markets from one year to the next and even within a given calendar year thus making individual cruise markets highly contestable (see, for example, Jainchill, May 21, 2008; September 22, 2008; and November 11, 2008) . and increase total cruise ship capacity there. As demand for cruise tourism is believed to be price elastic (GAO, 2004; FTC, 2002) consumers and the economies of Alaska and
Hawaii benefit from this flexible allocation of ship capacity. By allocating ships to markets that yield the highest return, economic efficiency is enhanced. If foreign cruise ships cannot profitably come back to Hawaii because of a more protectionist PVSA, the number of ships that can profitably sail in Alaska might also be reduced. Consumers may have to pay higher prices for Alaska cruises in the summer and higher prices for west coast to Hawaii cruises at other times of the year if the proposed narrower reinterpretation of the PVSA were adopted. In sum, NCLA's proposed remedy to limit the rule change only to cruise voyages to Hawaii will continue to "prejudice other cruise ports on the mainland."
VI. The Case for Repealing the Passenger Vessel Services Act
Since the late 1990s there has been growing interest in America to assess the economic impacts of government regulations. As a result, we have gained greater awareness of the welfare losses attributable to the proliferation of both economic and social regulations. Hahn (1998) has suggested a number of federal laws and programs "that should be targets for elimination" among them the Jones Act. Perhaps because its economic imprint on the U.S. economy is small relative to the much larger impacts produced by the Jones Act on domestic freight shipments, the companion Passenger Vessel Services Act has largely escaped public scrutiny. But no longer. The PVSA has become widely publicized in the U.S. recently because of Norwegian Cruise Line America's efforts to persuade Customs and Border Protection to make the PVSA even more protectionist in order to save its lone "American" cruise ship based in Hawaii from foreign competition. The analysis in this paper shows that NCLA's claims are without merit.
It is obvious that the current application of the PVSA allows foreign cruise lines to violate the original intent of the law when it was first passed 123 years ago to protect U.S. maritime commerce from foreign competition. But the law is obsolete. The PVSA increases costs to producers and consumers of cruise tourism services in North America.
It limits the cruise options available to consumers. The PVSA also confers rents to U.S.
cruise ports that are located close to foreign ports and transfers rents from U.S. ports to foreign ports. The effort by NCLA to make the PVSA even more protectionist will further reduce consumer welfare and America's national income. (Schaefers, February 13, 2008) . The current, and antiquated law imposes costs on a lot of people but confers few, if any, national benefits. It should be repealed. 34 MARAD, "By the Capes-A Primer on U.S. Coastwise Laws," p. 2. The General Accounting Office (GAO, 2004, p. 5) opined that "NCL's exemption also provides some potential economic benefits including jobs for the U.S. maritime sector, and tax revenues." However, GAO has not shown that this is the best way to create jobs and generate tax revenues. 35 The three ships were pulled from regular service. 
